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To Discovery and Beyond: A
Comprehensive Look at Argentina’s Data
Protection Laws
Sean McCleary*
This article strives to shed light on the interplay between
discovery practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Argentina's data protection laws, and the ever-present
possibility of discovery sanctions. For all intents and purposes, data protections laws serve as a double-edged sword
that seek to protect an individual's privacy; however, data
protection laws were not designed with litigation in mind.
And because of that, it can be difficult for an Argentine company to comply with a discovery request that would implicate an individual's data privacy under Argentine law. In the
end, it comes down to a balancing test. This article will explore the origins of data protections laws, the data protections laws in Argentina, discovery practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and how Argentina's data protection laws can significantly impact discovery practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of cross-border transactions has been met with a rise in
cross-border litigation. As American companies have increased
business activity in Latin America and the European Union (“EU”)
they have also encountered data protection laws. When compared to
other Latin American countries, Argentina presents a unique situation because it has comprehensive data protection laws that are similar to those in the EU1 Additionally, Argentina and the U.S. have a
trade relationship that is valued at $24.2 billion USD annually.2 As
globalization has accelerated in the past twenty years, it has become
increasingly common for a U.S. party to file a domestic lawsuit
against a foreign party.3 The majority of these lawsuits are breach of
contract actions. Almost inevitably, the involved parties will become immersed in pre-trial discovery.
1

Aldo M. Leiva, Data Protection Law in Spain and Latin America: Survey
of Legal Approaches, 41 INT’L LAW NEWS 4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/international_law_news/2012/fall/data_protection_law_spain_latin_america_survey_legal_approaches.html.
2
U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, Doing Business in Argentina, EXPORT.GOV
(Oct. 23, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://export.gov/Argentina/doingbusinessinargentin
a/index.asp.
3
See Lawyers for Civ. Justice et al., Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke Law School (May 10-11,
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archivesrules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil
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Pre-trial discovery is the “formal process of exchanging information between the parties about the witnesses and evidence [they
will] present at trial.”4 Traditional discovery involved the exchange
of hard-copy files and data. Today, discovery is increasingly conducted through the electronic exchange of information, a process
known as e-discovery.5 In many cases, pre-trial discovery may be
outcome-determinative for either party.
Because many foreign jurisdictions have varying standards for
the scope of pre-trial discovery, it is likely that many documents will
be protected under either a blocking statute or a data privacy or data
protection law.6 The U.S. has permissive discovery standards compared not only to civil law regimes in the EU, but also to many Latin
American countries such as Argentina.7 What is largely considered
standard pre-trial discovery in the U.S. is likely to be considered an
invasion of privacy in the EU and Argentina. Many, if not most, EU
members consider U.S. discovery standards to be invasive because
EU members consider data privacy to be a fundamental right.8 Paradoxically, although America has always placed a high value on privacy, its legal system encourages broad discovery procedures. Perhaps it is because pre-trial discovery is seen as an efficient way to

4
AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., How Courts Work,
AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/reso
urces/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/discovery.html
(last
visited Jan. 6, 2016).
5
Id.
6
Seth D. Rothman & Charles W. Cohen, The Impact on U.S. Discovery of
EU Data Protection and Discovery Blocking Statutes, HUGHES HUBBARD (January 2013), http://www.hugheshubbard.com/Documents/Impact%20on%20U%20
S%20%20Discovery%20of%20EU%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Discovery%20Blocking%
20Statutes.pdf (“‘Blocking Statutes’ are statutes which prohibit the transfer of
data for use in foreign proceedings unless the transfer complies with the Hague
Evidence Convention.”).
7
William D. Wood & Brian C. Boyle, Obtaining Foreign Discovery in U.S.
Litigation, 63 THE ADVOC. (Texas) 12 (2013).
8
Council Directive No. 95/46/EC, O.J. L 281/31 (1995), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir199546_part1_en.pdf. [hereinafter, EU Directive].
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“encourage early disclosure and efficient settlement prior to trial.”9
Pre-trial discovery has even been vaunted as a means to provide “informational equity.”10 By contrast, in many civil law countries, discovery is a function that is best carried out by judges.11 In their eyes,
discovery is best carried out by the only person in the case whose
duty is to be impartial.
This note has two aims: (1) to shed light on the labyrinth of discovery problems in Argentina and (2) to illustrate the impact that
data protection laws have on U.S. entities conducting business in
Argentina. For the purposes of highlighting the various discovery
problems that may arise under Argentina’s data protection laws, this
note will explore the following hypothetical situations: (1) A lawsuit
was filed in the U.S., thereby invoking U.S. discovery standards and
(2) the Defendant was an Argentine party that has discoverable data
in a physical or electronic form (electronically stored information or
“ESI”).
Part I of this note will provide a cursory understanding of the
procedures for conducting cross-border discovery under U.S. discovery standards. In Part I, I will first examine the Hague Evidence
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, as well as the problems associated with its interpretation. Part II of this note will discuss how data protection laws have impacted the ability of litigants
to conduct discovery. Much of this discussion will center around the
EU Directive (hereinafter, “Directive”) and the Directive’s influence on other nations to adopt data protection laws. Part III will specifically analyze the Directive’s influence on Argentina’s legislature, which prompted the country to create its own data protection

9

See Marissa L. P. Caylor, Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention: A
Proposed Solution to Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts During Civil and Commercial Litigation, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 341, 363, 364-68 (2010), for further discussion on why pre-trial discovery in civil law countries is uncommon.
10
See generally STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE,
PRACTICE AND CONTEXT, 388-418 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining basic rules of discovery).
11
Benjamin L. Klein, Trust, Respect, and Cooperation May Keep Us Out of
Jail: A Practical Guide to Navigating the European Union Privacy Directive’s
Restrictions on American Discovery Procedure, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 623,
625 (2012) (See 625-28 for further discussion on the tensions between the U.S.
and EU discovery dilemma.).
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laws. Additionally, Part III will discuss the problems that Argentina’s data protection laws present to U.S. litigators, which are similar to the problems that litigators face when dealing with European
entities. Finally, Part IV will discuss some of the proposed solutions
to resolve issues with cross-border discovery.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE GRAND SCHEME OF THINGS: U.S.
DISCOVERY ABROAD
When domestic and foreign litigants enter pre-trial discovery in
a U.S. jurisdiction, the court has options to mandate the foreign entity to either freeze or to produce discoverable materials. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, “FRCP”), a litigant
may request unprivileged data that is “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”12 In the past 15 years, e-discovery has been at
the forefront of pre-trial discovery for civil litigation. Because we
are moving further towards a paperless world, I will focus most of
the discussion on e-discovery versus traditional discovery.
The following provides a brief understanding of e-discovery: a
party transfers data to a vendor, which results in the creation of thousands, if not millions, of pages of information. In order to narrow
the amount of relevant data, the information may be sorted and filtered by either a simple keyword search, “boolean search,” or
through “predictive coding.”13 Predictive coding is a computer-assisted search function that has only recently been permitted by
courts.14 It can be cost-effective because it can process large volumes of data with minimal input by those that are searching the
data.15

12

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
Michael Lopresti, What is Predictive Coding?: Including eDiscovery Applications, KM WORLD (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/Editorial/What-Is- . . . /What-is-Predictive-Coding-Including-eDiscovery-Applications-87108.aspx.
14
See Global Aerospace Inc., v. Landow Aviation, L.P., Case No. CL 61040
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2012).
15
See Lopresti, supra note 13.
13
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A. Hague Evidence Convention and the U.S.’s Disdain for it
Prior to 1987, U.S. litigants seeking to request evidence from a
foreign entity were constrained by the Hague Evidence Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (hereinafter, “Hague Convention”).16 The Hague Convention was established in order to “reconcile the differing legal philosophies of the Civil Law, Common Law,
and other systems with regard to taking evidence.”17 The Hague
Convention, which the U.S. and Argentina are both parties to, allows
states seeking evidence to send a Letter of Request to the state in
which the evidence is located.18 Article 1 of the Hague Convention
allows U.S. litigants to obtain evidence from foreign witnesses
much to the same extent that the litigant would be able to obtain that
evidence in the U.S.19
Soon after the Hague Convention was established, it began to
unravel at the seams—in one fell swoop, the Convention allowed
countries to opt-out of pre-trial discovery.20 Per Article 23, the
Hague Convention allowed signatory nations to sign a limiting reservation that would disallow the execution of Letters of Request for
purposes of pre-trial discovery.21 Argentina has exercised this right
and it has disallowed pre-trial discovery under the Hague Convention, forcing litigants to search for an alternative means to make pretrial discovery requests.22 Despite its aspirational attempt to create a
unified and global system for requesting evidence from abroad,
many have argued that the Hague Convention has failed to achieve
16
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 541 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale].
17
See Caylor, supra note 9, at 344 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
18
Argentina was not an original party to the Convention, but it ratified the
Convention on May 8, 1987. See The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555
T.I.A.S. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
19
Caylor, supra note 9, at 344.
20
See id. at 344-46 (noting that the addition of Limiting Reservations defeats
the purpose of the Hague Convention).
21
David W. Ogden & Sarah G. Rapawy, Discovery in Transnational Litigation: Procedures and Procedural Issues, ABA Business Law Section Spring
Meeting, 2007, at 12, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter
/0058/materials/pp1.pdf.
22
Id.
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its goal.23Arguably, the Hague Convention failed because of its eagerness to please European constituents.
Realizing its lack of utility, U.S. courts needed a solution to circumvent the Hague Convention for a number of reasons. In addition
to the execution of limiting reservations, other features of the Hague
Convention also proved to be time-consuming. Letters of Request
often take a considerable amount of time to process and, in many
cases, they prove to be fruitless.24 As a result, critics of the Hague
Convention point out that it is poorly suited for the U.S.’s globalized
economy.25 The need for efficient discovery is ever-present in a
world where cross-border litigation is commonplace.
The U.S. Supreme Court added the final nail in the Hague Convention’s proverbial coffin by deeming its use discretionary.26 In
1987, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (hereinafter, “Aerospatiale”) that the Hague Convention was not the exclusive means for gathering evidence abroad:
the FRCP could be applied as well.27 Here, litigants dissuaded by
the Hague Convention’s limiting reservations were offered an alternative avenue for making pre-trial discovery requests in countries
23

See Caylor, supra note 9, at 372 (“The Hague Convention’s inability to
keep pace with globalization and its lengthy processing times have made it ineffective.”).
24
See id.
25
See Moze Cowper & Amor Esteban, E-Discovery, Privacy, and the Transfer of Data Across Borders: Proposed Solutions for Cutting the Gordian Knot, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 263, 272 (2009) (discussing why the Hague Convention on the
taking evidence from abroad is anachronistic).
26
This was a personal injury case stemming from a plane crash in Iowa. The
French government owned the corporations that made the planes. The victims
filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The
parties initially conducted discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but the defendants filed a motion for a protective order claiming that the Federal
Rules are not applicable because the information sought was in France. The district court denied the motion. Upon appeal, the Eight Circuit affirmed. The case
reached the Supreme Court with the question of to what extent to which a federal
district court must employ the procedures set forth in the Hague Convention when
litigants seek answers to interrogatories, the production of documents, and admissions from a French adversary over whom the court has personal jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court ruled that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means of
obtaining evidence from a foreign litigant, and the Hague Convention does not
need to be used first. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541.
27
See id.
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that signed limiting reservations. The Court stated that the Hague
Convention is “a permissive supplement, not a pre-emptive replacement, for other means of obtaining evidence abroad.”28 The Court
concluded by establishing a five-factor balancing test for judges to
use when determining whether it is appropriate to apply the FRCP.
The factors to be weighed are as follows:
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or other information requested; (2) the degree
of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information originated in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the
state where the information is located.29
Adding insult to injury, the Supreme Court stated that any mandatory application of the Hague Convention would undermine U.S.
legal proceedings.30 Just as the Hague Convention catered to the
countries that wanted to avoid pre-trial discovery, the Supreme
Court catered to U.S. litigants that needed to engage in it for purposes of developing their case. U.S. courts have also ruled that the
FRCP can be applied in jurisdictional discovery.31
It is worth noting that, although the Hague Convention has been
disfavored by U.S. courts, it is still widely used by other countries.32
In defense of the Hague Convention, while it may be ineffective for
pre-trial discovery and it may require a lengthy wait for a response,
it does promote international cooperation.33 Further, much of pretrial discovery’s purpose is to promote cooperation between oppos-

28

Id. at 536.
Id. at 544.
30
See Caylor, supra note 9, at 346-48.
31
See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2000).
32
James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence Convention After Aerospatiale, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 103, 114 (2003).
33
See id.
29
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ing litigants. Additionally, the Convention has been useful for countries that have similar data privacy laws.34 If two countries have
signed limiting reservations under Article 23, then conducting crossborder discovery between the two countries should be fairly predictable because both countries have opted out of using Letters of Request in pre-trial discovery.
III. EU DIRECTIVE: A MODEL FOR DATA PROTECTION
EVERYWHERE
In 1995, the European Commission adopted the EU Directive.
The Directive was aimed at harmonizing divergent data protection
regimes among EU member states in order to remove obstacles to
the free flow of information and at “protect[ing] fundamental rights
and freedoms, notably the right to privacy,” by establishing minimum safeguards for the use of personal data.35
Prior to the Directive, the EU was scattered with varying data
protection laws.36 Data protection laws in some form or another
have existed in Europe since at least 1970.37 To help effectuate the
goal of harmonization, the EU Directive creates obligations for data
controllers38 and data processors.39 An example of the relationship
between a data processor and data controller would be the relationship that exists between a corporation and the company that performs its payroll services.40 The corporation is the data controller

34

Id.
EU Directive, supra note 8.
36
Chuan Sun, The European Union Privacy Directive and Its Impact on the
U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 99, 100 (2003).
37
Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions
and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1969 (2013).
38
The EU Directive defines “controller” as “the person or entity that determines, alone or jointly with others, the purposes and the means of the processing
of personal data.” See EU Directive, supra note 8.
39
See id.
40
Bridget Treacy, Working Party confirms ‘controller’ and ‘processor’ distinction, HUNTON AND WILLIAMS, (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.hunton.com/f
iles/Publication/8fe272d1-d29c-4abd-85ae-17843d084da3/Presentation/Publicati
onAttachment/6d1be60b-be7d-413c-bd6f-6ee37c02c631/Treacy_controller-proc
essor_distinctions.pdf.
35
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because it is providing the scope to which its payroll company, its
data processor, can process the corporation’s data41.
The EU Directive also acts to enforce individuals’ rights.42 Personal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person.”43 Put more simply, personal data can be
information that relates to, among other characteristics, a person’s
physical, psychological, mental, or cultural traits.44 The Directive’s
definition of personal data is extremely broad in scope. Due to the
Directive’s numerous data safeguards, the flow of information from
EU states to the U.S. is greatly hindered—the Directive prohibits the
transfer of data to a third country unless that country has adopted
adequate data protection laws.45
Argentina is one of a few countries outside of the EU that has
been deemed to have adequate data protection laws under the Directive’s standard.46 Because of its closely aligned data protection
laws, one would expect that data transfers between the EU and an
entity in Argentina would be easier than data transfers between entities with discordant data protection schemes, such as a transfer between the U.S. and Argentina.
A. Data Transfers under the EU Directive
The following represents three circumstances where data transfers are permitted under the EU Directive: (1) when there is consent
by the data subject; (2) when it is necessary to meet a legal obligation; or (3) when it is necessary for the purposes of a legitimate interest.47 However, these transfers are not intended for litigation purposes.
Consent can be required in many circumstances. For example,
consent will likely be required when there is a request to retain data
for longer than local laws allow.48 Obtaining valid consent can be
41

See id.
See Chuan Sun, supra note 36, at 7.
43
EU Directive, supra note 8.
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
See Maxim Gakh, Argentina’s Protection of Personal Data: Initiation and
Response, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 781, 782 (2006).
47
EU Directive, supra note 8.
48
Id.
42
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challenging, particularly when dealing with a customer’s information. For one, if the discovery request implicates the data of thousands of individuals, it is not reasonable for a company to request
permission to process data from each customer, be it personal or
sensitive. Of course, companies could request consent from customers as part of a business transaction—waivers are commonplace in
modern business transactions. Under Argentina’s data protection
laws, consent is not necessary when it arises out of a contractual
relationship.49 In many cases, receiving consent is either too expensive or too time consuming. Because Argentina and EU members
have a greater affinity for data privacy and protection, they will
likely have lower expectation as to the quantity of potentially discoverable data.
Argentina is one of many countries outside of Europe that views
data privacy as a fundamental right. As mentioned above, its data
protection statutes have been deemed adequate, thereby meeting the
EU Directive’s standard.50 This allows for data to flow more freely
between Argentina and EU members.51 In contrast, many foreign
entities, particularly European countries, are hesitant to store data in
the U.S. because of relatively permissive laws on data privacy.52
B. Safe-Harbor Program
After the EU directive was implemented, the Department of
Commerce acted quickly to prevent a complete bulwark of data
transfer between the EU and the U.S.53 Realistically, neither the U.S.
49

See PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DATOS PERSONALES [PERSONAL DATA
PROTECTION ACT], Ley 25.326, Nov. 2, 2000 BOLETÍN OFICIAL [B.O.] 1 (Arg.)
available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/u
npan044147.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) [hereinafter “PDPA”].
50
See Gakh, supra note 46, at 781-82.
51
See id. at 783.
52
Following Edward Snowden’s leak, details over the NSA’s access to cloud
computing sources has continued to deter non-U.S. companies from storing data
in the U.S. See Andrea Peterson, NSA Snooping Could Cost U.S. Tech Companies
$35 Billion over Three Years, WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:46 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/ns
a-snooping-could-cost-u-s-tech-companies-35-billion-over-three-years/.
53
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV (Feb. 15, 2014),
http://www.export.gov/
safeharbor/.
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nor the EU could survive in the absence of one another’s economy.54
In order to take initiative, the Department of Commerce established
a Safe-Harbor program to help facilitate data transfers.55 Under the
Safe-Harbor program, which was approved by the EU in 2000, U.S.
companies that maintained certain privacy policies would be
deemed to have an adequate level of protection.56 A downside to the
Safe-Harbor program is that U.S. companies have had to cope with
increased costs in maintaining adequate privacy policies.57 The
Safe-Harbor program was specifically designed and implemented in
order to keep trade and commerce flowing—thus, it was not designed to aid litigants’ discovery requests.58 Initially, the program
was unsuccessful.59 Within a few years of its implementation, fewer
than 500 companies had joined the program.60 One significant reason for the program’s lack of success was because of policy changes
that followed its creation.61 Contrary to what one might believe, following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. did not tighten
data protection; instead, the U.S. legislature made it easier for the
government to access data.62 Meanwhile in the EU, data protection
was getting stricter.63 These diverging policies made it difficult for
U.S. companies to comply with the program.

54
See William H. Cooper, EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and
Magnitude, CRS REPORT, (March 20, 2009).
55
Id.
56
Gakh, supra note 46, at 783-84.
57
See Chuan Sun, supra note 36, at 100.
58
See id. at 104 (discussing several ways that business can be disrupted between the EU and the U.S. in the absence of a data transfer scheme such as the
Safe-Harbor Program).
59
See id. at 110 (only twenty companies had joined the program within three
months of its implementation).
60
See id.
61
See id. at 109.
62
See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of
U.S.C.).
63
See Chuan Sun, supra note 36, at 109; see Council Directive 2002/58, 2002
O.J. (L 201) 1 (EC).
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IV. ARGENTINA’S PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT
Argentina is a pioneer in the field of data protection by being the
first country in Latin America to adopt comprehensive data protection laws.64 Argentina took initiative by adopting data protection
laws modeled after Spain’s data protection laws.65 Argentina’s codification of data protection is the Personal Data Protection Act (hereinafter, “PDPA”) No. 25.326.66 The purpose of the PDPA is to implement Argentina’s constitutional guarantees to data privacy.67
Specifically, the Act reads as follows:
The purpose of this Act is the full protection of personal information recorded in data files, registers,
banks or other technical means of data-treatment, either public or private for purposes of providing reports, in order to guarantee the honor and intimacy
of persons, as well as the access to the information
that may be recorded about such persons, in accordance with the provisions of Section 43, Third Paragraph of the National Constitution.68
The PDPA guarantees individuals’ rights and protections under
the law and affords them access to their data.69 As stated, the law
applies to both public and private persons and legal entities that own
databases.70 In summary, the PDPA regulates data users’ ability to
process personal or sensitive data.71
There are striking similarities between the PDPA and the EU
Directive. Specifically, Argentina and the EU share almost identical
64

See Gakh, supra note 46, for a more comprehensive understanding of the
differences in data protection between the U.S., Europe, and Latin America; Andrés Guadamuz, Habeas Data: The Latin American Response to Data Protection,
2001 J. INFO. L. & TECH. 3, https://www2.warwick.
ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_2/guadamuz/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
65
John C. Eustice & Marc Alain Bohn, Navigating the Gauntlet: A Survey of
Data Privacy Laws in Three Key Latin American Countries, 14 SEDONA CONF. J.
137, 138 (2013).
66
See PDPA, supra note 49.
67
See id. § 1.
68
Id. (emphasis added).
69
See id.
70
See id. § 2.
71
See id.
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definitions of “data.”72 Under the PDPA, “personal data” is defined
as “information of any kind referred to certain or ascertainable physical persons or legal entities.”73 Sensitive Data, which receives a
higher degree of protection, is defined as “personal data revealing
racial and ethnic origin, political opinions, religious, philosophical
or moral beliefs, labor union membership, and information concerning health conditions or sexual habits or behavior.”74 The PDPA regulates “data users”75 and “data owner[s].”76 Under the PDPA, citizens are given wide latitude in accessing their own data.77
A. Citizens’ Right of Action: Habeas Data
In some instances, the PDPA grants greater data privacy protection than the laws in Europe and, in particular, the U.S. Argentina
has afforded its citizens a private right of action known as Habeas
Data.78 This cause of action falls into a category of constitutional
rights known as “amparo.”79 The Argentine Constitution was
amended in 1994 to add a provision dealing with privacy.80 The relevant article of Argentina’s Constitution reads as follows:
Any person shall file this action to obtain information
on the data about himself and their purpose, registered in public records or data bases, or in private
ones intended to supply information; and in case of
false data or discrimination, this action may be filed
to request the suppression, rectification, confidentiality or updating of said data. The secret nature of the
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Compare PDPA, supra note 49, with EU Directive, supra note 8.
PDPA, supra note 49.
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Id.
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Id. (“Any person, either public or private, performing in its, his or her discretion the treatment of data contained in files, registers or banks, owned by such
persons or to which they may have access through a connection.”).
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Id. (“Any physical person or legal entity having a legal domicile or local
offices or branches in the country, whose data are subject to the treatment referred
to in this Act.”).
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See id.
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Guadamuz, Habeas Data, supra note 64 at 3, 3.2.4.
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See id.
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See id.
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sources of journalistic information shall not be impaired.81
Essentially, Habeas Data is a positive right that allows individuals to bring an action to protect their constitutional right to data
privacy.82 This right to access their information is codified in the
PDPA as well.83 Habeas Data can prove to be problematic when
Argentine companies or entities are required to produce ESI that implicates the data privacy rights of countless individuals. On the other
hand, the amount of people bringing these Habeas Data claims is
rather low.84
B. Enforcement and Oversight of the PDPA
While evidence suggests that enforcement is rather lax, PDPA
violations still carry severe penalties.85 The Argentine Personal Data
Protection Agency (hereinafter, “APDPA”) is the agency that oversees the PDPA.86 The agency has the power to review complaints
and the power to initiate investigations on its own.87 Upon finding a

81

Art. 43, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.), available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html.
82
See Gakh, supra note 46, at 785.
83
See PDPA, supra note 49 (“SECTION 33.- Legal Basis of a Complaint The action for the protection of personal data or of habeas data shall be applicable: (a) to acquire knowledge of personal data stored in public or private data files,
registers or banks intended for the provision of reports, as well as purposes
thereof; (b) to those cases in which the falsehood, inaccuracy or outdating of the
relevant information is presumed, and the treatment of such data whose registration is prohibited by this Act, in order to demand their suppression, rectification,
confidentiality or updating.”).
84
See Gakh, supra note 46, at 789-91 (discussing the plaintiff’s heightened
pleading requirement, which can make it difficult for a plaintiff to assert his
rights).
85
Only 19 fines were issued between 2005 and mid-2012. It is believed that
the lack of sanctions is a result of insufficient resources. See Eustice, supra note
65, at 141.
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Alec Christie, et al., Argentina: Data Protection Laws of the World Handbook: Second Edition – Argentina, MONDAQ (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/x/230846/data+protection/Data+Protection+Laws+of+the+World+Handbook+Second+Edition+Argentina.
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violation, the agency can impose fines or revoke the data controller’s ability to maintain a database.88 Civil fines include a “warning,
suspension, or a fine ranging between [$1,000 to $100,000].”89 Additionally, there are criminal sanctions for certain intentional acts,
such as inserting false information into a database.90 Criminal penalties can range from one month to multiple years of imprisonment.91 These criminal penalties show how seriously the APDPA
takes data privacy violations.
In order for an entity to keep data, its database must be registered
with the APDPA.92 Regardless of whether it is a public or private
entity, so long as the entity is not using the data for personal use, it
must be registered.93 Consent is the key, in most instances, to a data
controllers’ ability to transfer and process data.94 In some instances,
consent is not required altogether.95 When personal data is being
collected, notice must be provided to those whose data is affected.96
Entities must provide:
(i) the purpose for which the data is being collected,
(ii) who may receive the data, (iii) the existence of a
database, the identity of the data collector and its
mailing address; (iv) the consequences of providing
the data, of refusing to do so or of providing inaccurate information; and (v) the data subject’s access,
rectification and suppression rights.97
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Id.
Id.
90
Id.
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PDPA, supra note 49, § 32.
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See Christie, supra note 86.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (“(i) the data is collected from a publicly accessible database, in the
exercise of government duties, or as a result of a legal obligation, (ii) the database
is limited to certain basic information, such as name, ID, tax ID, job, birthdate and
address, (iii) the personal data derives from a scientific or professional contractual
relationship and is used only in such context, or (iv) the information is provided
by financial institutions, provided that they were required to do so by a court, the
Central Bank or a tax authority”).
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Once the data is collected and stored in a database, it must be
“truthful, adequate, pertinent, and not excessive, be used exclusively
for the purpose for which it was legally obtained and be deleted on
completion of that purpose.”98 Depending on the level of security
that is required, the data controller may have a legal obligation to
have someone appointed to maintain adequate security.99 Regardless, data controllers must maintain an adequate system that notifies
them of any breaches.100
In order for personal data to be transferred outside of Argentina,
several conditions must be met.101 Transferring personal data requires the data owner’s consent as well as the presence of a legitimate interest between the transferring and the receiving parties.102
Thus, international data transfers are only lawful in a few circumstances.103 Under the PDPA, “[t]he treatment of personal data is unlawful when the data owner has not given his or her express consent,
which must be given in writing, or through any other similar means,
depending on the circumstances.”104 There are separate standards
for the ability to transfer personal data and sensitive data. Not surprisingly, sensitive data is granted a greater level of protection.105
Sensitive data can only be collected and utilized when there is a general interest authorized by law.106 Examples of sensitive data can be
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See Christie, supra note 86.
See id.
100
See id.
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Eustice, supra note 65, at 140.
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PDPA, supra note 49, at § 12 (“a) international judicial cooperation; b)
exchange of medical information, when so required for the treatment of the party
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pursuance of the terms of Paragraph e) of the foregoing Section; c) stock exchange
or banking transfers, to the extent thereof, and in pursuance of the applicable laws;
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against organized crime, terrorism and drug-trafficking”).
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anything from information that details someone’s racial background, to information detailing someone’s sexual orientation.107
Additionally, no person can be compelled to provide sensitive
data.108 Essentially, sensitive data can only be collected for public
interest purposes.109
C. Problems Facing Litigators and Entities under the PDPA
Despite a seemingly rigid and aspirational data protection law
scheme, many critics point to flaws in the PDPA.110 Recently, Argentina’s laws came under fire for three reasons: (1) the PDPA lacks
any actual enforcement capability; (2) the language of the PDPA has
not kept up with technological advances; and (3) the penalties for
violating the law are not as serious as those within the EU111 Combined, these issues have even caused some to critically examine Argentina’s commitment to data protection.112 In fact, some people do
not feel that Argentina has adequate data protection as defined under
the Directive.113 Aside from the PDPA’s technical problems, the law
has also frustrated many litigators because it aspires to be much
more than it is; the PDPA attempts to provide far-reaching and comprehensive data protection, but it does not provide enough transparency for litigators to predict whether they will be subject to sanctions.114
In theory, the PDPA, like the Directive, inevitably impedes the
flow of information from Argentina to the U.S. Critics of the Directive claimed that strict enforcement of the Directive would hurt
trans-Atlantic trade.115 The same concerns would apply to trade between Argentina and any country with inadequate data protection.
107

Id. §2.
Id. §7.
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Similar to the discovery problems that U.S. litigators face in the
EU, Argentina’s laws have posed countless issues to U.S. litigators
as well. One particular problem area concerns the treatment of both
personal and sensitive data with respect to work emails. In the U.S.,
work emails are not subject to the data protections standards present
in the EU and Argentina.116 Courts have gone as far as to say that
the personal emails of company employees were discoverable in litigation.117 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a company
may monitor its employees’ phone usage for work-related purposes.118 Thus, in the U.S., work emails are not considered private,
thereby making them accessible to the employer.119 Therefore, U.S.
employers would not face many problems when producing emails
or text messages for discovery requests.120 On the other hand, work
emails are protected in Argentina.121 If an email contains personal
or sensitive data, the employer will likely face a roadblock in trying
to comply with a U.S. discovery request. The data owner will generally not be forced to consent to its production in litigation.122 In
many fields of law, emails may form the foundation of a litigant’s
case. Embedded in an email may be information that is disserving
to the defendant. In the absence of such emails, it may be difficult
to establish key elements in a cause of action, making it fatal for a
plaintiff’s case. On the other hand, if the defendant fails to produce
the emails, the U.S. court is not likely to respect the privacy rights
of foreign individuals.123 The court will instruct the jury that the defendant failed to produce documents; the inference that is drawn will
certainly not be favorable to the defendant124.
tml.
116

European employees can deny consent to monitoring programs. See generally Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26
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Under Argentine law, a party that violates the PDPA may be
subject both to civil fines and criminal sanctions.125 If the Argentine
entity fails to produce documents after receiving a discovery request, the entity will likely face sanctions and other penalties for
noncompliance. Argentine parties may be willing to produce documents if it only results in a small fine, but the risk of criminal sanctions is not likely compel someone to produce documents at the request of a U.S. court.126 After all, how many litigators are willing to
go to jail for their client? To that end, U.S. courts should be sensitive
to the dilemma Argentine entities face, and should not be too quick
to penalize a party who fails to produce documents for fear of criminal sanctions. U.S. courts have instructed the trier of fact to draw
an adverse inference when the foreign entity fails to produce the
documents requested during discovery.127 By drawing an adverse
inference, the trier of fact assumes that the non-producing party is
hiding damaging information—completely ignoring the possibility
that a conflict of laws could prevent the party from producing the
information.
Once a U.S. litigant has made a discovery request in a U.S. court,
the Argentine party has to choose between following the request or
following Argentine law, which generally prohibits the transfer of
data to countries with inadequate data laws.128 The transfer of data
out of Argentina will very likely infringe on the data privacy rights
of individuals who are not a party to the lawsuit. Most likely, the
data rights of employees and customers will be affected. This is
where a fundamental conflict occurs. Courts must decide whether to
order the production of data or to respect the domestic data privacy
laws of the foreign country.
In a landmark case on foreign litigants’ noncompliance with a
court-ordered discovery request, the Supreme Court ruled that a foreign litigant could not be subject to the consequences of noncompliance as their noncompliance was the result of obeying the home

125

See Eustice, supra note 65, at 141.
PDPA, supra note 49, § 32.
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 (1987) [hereinafter, Restatement]; see also Cowper, supra note 17, at 264.
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country’s law.129 Further to that end, Section 442 of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations (hereinafter, “Restatement”) requires
that foreign litigants “make a good faith effort to secure permission
from the foreign authorities to make the information available”
whenever complying with a production order would subject them to
civil or criminal penalties in their home country.130 It has been aptly
stated that both the Restatement and the Hague Convention are illsuited in our ever-globalizing world.131
D. Consequences of Noncompliance with U.S. Discovery
Order.
E-discovery has made cross-border discovery under the Restatement and the Hague Convention nearly impossible because of the
amount of information that can be stored electronically. Modern
technology has allowed entities to maintain vast troves of data.132
The more information that is stored, the more likely that a great
number of individuals’ privacy rights will be affected. There is no
doubt that pre-trial discovery can make or break many cases.133 On
one hand, pre-trial discovery often acts as an incentive for parties to
settle.134 When a company is faced with staggering discovery prices,
it only seems logical that settlement may be less costly than litigation; however, if settlement is not an option and the foreign party is
unable to comply with the discovery request, the Restatement suggests that sanctions should not be applied when a good faith effort

129

See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958) (finding that Swiss plaintiff’s
production of documents would have violated Swiss laws).
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See Restatement, supra note 127, § 442..
131
See Caylor, supra note 9, at 264.
132
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private multinational corporations. Amazon’s database, for instance, stores the
information of nearly 60 million customers, or 42 terabytes of data. See Top 10
Largest Databases in the World, COMPAREBUSINESSPRODUCTS.COM,
http://www.comparebusinessproducts.com/fyi/10-largest-dat
abases-in-the-world (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
133
See Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 71, 71-72 (2012).
134
Id.

150

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

has been made—but, courts can, and do, impose an adverse inference against the foreign party for noncompliance.135 Although the
Restatement tries to protect foreign parties, U.S. courts can and do
use their discretion to draw adverse inferences in a wide array of
domestic litigation.136 An adverse inference can often be outcomedeterminative. Because of this practice, it is clear that when a foreign entity files suit in the U.S. they will not be allowed to avail
themselves of the data protection laws of their country. So, if an Argentine entity were to file a suit in the U.S. and hope for a favorable
outcome, the entity is expected to produce discovery materials much
to the same extent as it would be expected if it were located in the
U.S.137
U.S. courts are not hesitant to issue adverse inferences. For example, the district court in Lyondell Citgo Refining issued an adverse inference despite claims by the defendant that it had made a
good faith effort to produce certain requested materials.138 Generally
speaking, adverse inferences afford judges wide latitude in making
decisions that certainly have a significant impact on a case’s outcome. In fact, the standard of review for a judges’ pre-trial discovery
motion is “clearly erroneous.”139 Courts have posited that the adverse inference is “the necessary mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance.”140 In understanding the underlying purpose of an
adverse inference, it is important to understand that “[t]he inference
is adverse to the destroyer not because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the risk that the evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable should fall on the party responsible
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See Restatement, supra note 127, § 442.
See Mali v. Federal Insurance Company, No. 11-5413, 2013 WL 2631369,
slip op. (2d Cir. June 13, 2013).
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for its loss.”141 Foreign entities face the additional risk that if its lawyers comply with U.S. discovery demands in violation of their domestic laws, they may face criminal liability.142 Foreign litigators
are forced to balance the costs and benefits between complying with
U.S. discovery requests and violating the PDPA. If they comply
with the discovery request, then they may be subject to criminal liability and civil fines.143 On the other hand, if they refuse to comply
with the discovery request, then they face the imposition of an adverse inference, which may or may not be outcome-determinative to
their case. Putting litigators in this case poses conflicting ethical obligations.144 In some instances, where only a fine may be imposed
for a violation, then it may be worth the cost to violate the PDPA.
Unfortunately, these determinations are not so clear and easy to
make. It has often been difficult to determine when the APDPA will
or will not enforce the PDPA.145
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR EU-U.S. DISCOVERY PROBLEMS
Attempting to solve cross-border discovery problems in Argentina is no easy task. There are optimists that believe a solution is
possible, only requiring some form of compromise,146 while there
are others who believe that a solution is far beyond reach.147 Rather,
they believe that only a series of protocols can help effectuate discovery requests.148 It is unlikely that Argentina will ever fully comply with U.S. discovery requests because Argentina, like the EU, has
141
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Advising a foreign client to break the law in Argentina by violating a data
protection law would certainly conflict with most states’ rules on professional responsibility. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1992).
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152 (2011) (claiming that it is unrealistic to think that an entity could fully comply
with both foreign data protection laws and a U.S. discovery request).
148
See id.
142

152

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

differing opinions on privacy and data protection.149 With respect to
discovery issues in the EU, many parties have tried to come up with
a workable solution.
There are at least three solutions that may help to create crossborder discovery more predictable. One solution is to establish a
committee that can determine specifically where the issues lie and
then work with the legislature to reconcile them.150 The second solution is to establish a series of procedures that entities can follow
when faced with a U.S. discovery request.151 A third solution is to
update the Hague Evidence Convention.152 It is worth mentioning
that these solutions do not exist in a vacuum. Any one solution alone
will not likely suffice.
A. Establish a Working Party
Following the implementation of the EU directive, the European
Parliament established the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
(“Working Party”).153 While the Working Party is not a solution in
and of itself, it is tasked with the duty of finding solutions to crossborder discovery obligations and has helped to highlight the issues.154 Although discovery issues in the EU are slightly different
than they are in Argentina, the Working Party’s solutions still provide a great deal of guidance.
By finding solutions to cross-border discovery, the Working
Party has to strike a balance between an individual’s right to their
data and the “free movement of such data.”155 The Working Party
has been granted advisory status and acts independently of the European Parliament—essentially, it acts as an advisory committee.156
In 2009, the Party released a paper titled, Working Document on
149
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Pre-trial Discovery for Cross-Border Civil Litigation.157 The paper
took notice of some of the struggles between the right to data privacy
and the need to improve cross-border discovery.158 Specifically, the
paper addressed: “Pre-emptive document preservation in anticipation of proceedings before U.S. courts or in response to requests for
litigation hold, known as ‘freezing’ [and] pre-trial discovery requests in U.S. civil litigation.”159
Creating an organization similar to the Working Party would be
a great starting point for solving the dilemma that currently affects
the U.S. and Argentina. While there has been wide publication of
sanctions imposed against U.S. companies operating in the EU,
there has been little, if any, publication of companies being fined by
the APDPA.160 Because there is little case law regarding U.S.-Argentina discovery problems, an advisory committee could help bring
light to specific issues that will prove to be problematic going forward. One suggestion by the Working Party is that “[o]nce personal
data has been identified, the data controller would need to consider
whether it is necessary for all of the personal data to be processed,
or for example, could it be produced in an anonymous or redacted
form.”161 This solution can be effective where the names of the data
subjects are not specifically requested in pre-trial discovery, or
where the names of the data subjects are not consequential to the
discovery request.
In its paper, the Working Party established guidelines after they
appropriately recognized that data protection obligations do not coexist well with foreign discovery requirements.162 The Working
157

Working Document on Pre-trial Discovery for Cross-Border Civil Litigation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Feb. 15, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policie
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Party stated that because each level of discovery during litigation
amounts to a processing of the data, there must be a justification at
each stage.163 The Directive does not allow arbitrary processing.164
In Europe, like in Argentina, data controllers are not permitted to
retain personal data indefinitely in the anticipation of future litigation.165 This becomes problematic because the FRCP allows parties
to send a discovery request to produce and permit the inspection of
items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.166
The Working Party suggests that so long as data controllers freeze
the documents that they currently have in their possession, then they
cannot be faulted.167 As long as data controllers retain information
for short periods in abidance with local laws, they will not be violating any data protection laws, nor will they be violating any discovery requests.168 Of course, this does not bode well for the party
seeking the information because they will likely be seeking data
from an earlier time; however, U.S. courts have held that the test to
determine the production of documents is “control, not location.”169
Control is the “the legal right to obtain [the] documents on demand.”170
If an entity receives a litigation hold, they are being asked to
freeze the data. Essentially, the entity is being asked to process data,
by retaining it longer than it otherwise would have.171 Under the EU
directive, retaining data in the anticipation of future litigation
amounts to a “processing.”172 Holding data for the “mere unsubstantiated possibility” that a lawsuit will be filed is not enough to pass
163
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muster under EU laws.173 There is no reason to suspect that this
would be any different in Argentina. Under the FRCP, failure to preserve, in and of itself, opens a party up to sanctions.174 In fact, the
most common type of discovery sanction is the failure to preserve
ESI.175 Recognizing that Argentina’s data privacy is comparable to
that in the EU, the Working Party’s resolution helps to provide guidance to Argentina-U.S. discovery issues. “The Working Party recognizes that the parties involved in litigation have a legitimate interest in accessing information that is necessary to make or defend a
claim, but this must be balanced with the rights of the individual
whose personal data is being sought.”176
The Working Party makes many valid suggestions that can help
entities embroiled in U.S. discovery comply with Argentina data
protection laws without ignoring a discovery request. As previously
mentioned, the Working Party is neither the solution, nor the endgame.
B. The Sedona Conference
The Sedona Conference Journal has been one of the foremost
authorities on U.S. discovery practices and its conflict with European and Latin American data protection laws.177 The Conference
has published resources on a wide array of e-discovery issues.
Among other significant publications, the Conference published
several papers that address cross-border discovery. One paper in
particular, published in June 2011, addressed the discovery issues
that face multinational corporations.178 The paper provided practical
considerations and protocols.179 By doing so, it focused on making
multinationals prepared to handle the task of cross border discovery
obligations.180 Although the paper provides guidance in reference to
multinationals, the guidance and solutions can be applied to nearly
173

See id.
Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et. al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By
the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010).
175
See id.
176
See Working Document, supra note 157, at 2.
177
The Sedona Conference, https://thesedonaconference.org/publications.
178
See Zeunert, supra note 147, at 152.
179
See id.
180
See generally id.
174

156

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

any entity operating in Argentina that potentially faces U.S. discovery obligations.
The paper addresses four organizational challenges that multinationals face when dealing with cross-border discovery: (1) getting
e-discovery experts on board early in the process; (2) educating and
working together with opposing counsel; (3) the presence of additional time-consuming measures; and (4) fully complying with the
discovery request.181 Acknowledging these challenges before facing
a discovery request may help, but it is ultimately self-defeating to
think that one could satisfy both U.S. laws and Argentine laws.182
Multinational companies faced with the task of complying with
U.S. discovery obligations would be wise to hire an e-discovery expert as soon as possible.183 This is important because understanding
where discoverable data is located and how to process it efficiently
is absolutely necessary in order to comply with a discovery request
promptly. It is suggested that multinationals would suffer if they relied solely on advice from U.S. trial lawyers when anticipating a
discovery request.184 By hiring in-house e-discovery experts, a multinational can maintain consistency in processing and addressing
U.S. discovery requests.185 For companies that are large enough, it
may be cost-effective to create an e-discovery department.186 An ediscovery team, it is suggested, can create a standardized process
that is implemented company-wide.187
The second challenge requires that foreign entities educate their
employees on the U.S. discovery requests and working with opposing counsel.188 A simple solution to this challenge would be to meet
and confer in the hopes that opposing counsel is receptive to the
challenges that the defendant is facing.189
181

See id. at 147-152.
Id. at 151 (While handling the organizational challenges may be a matter
of sheer effort and goodwill, it seems illusory (at first glance at least) to conduct
an e-discovery in Europe expecting to fully satisfy U.S. law and European data
protection legislation as well as other applicable legal requirements).
183
Id.
184
See Zeunert, supra note 147.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See id. at 149.
189
See id.
182

WINTER 2015–2016]

TO DISCOVERY AND BEYOND

157

A solution to the third challenge, which is closely related to the
second, requires that a discovery schedule is created so that both
parties can understand the complexity of cross-border discovery in
their respective situation.190
Lastly, the fourth challenge requires that multinationals keep in
touch with the latest technical capabilities of filtering through discoverable data.191 The benefits to this solution are twofold: multinationals can efficiently filter through personal and sensitive data, and
they can do so in a timely manner.
Beyond the organizational challenges facing multinationals, the
paper addresses conditions that must be met in order for multinationals to come to a solution with opposing counsel.192 The first condition is that multinationals need to have the same willingness to
comply with U.S. discovery requests as U.S.-based corporations
do.193 European and Latin American entities are not as accustomed
to e-discovery and its staggering prices.194 U.S. lawyers are more
aware of the penalties for failure to follow U.S. discovery requests.195 Entities in Europe or Latin American may need to acquire
the same “willingness” in order for some solution to be found.196 In
order to encourage this elusive concept of “willingness,” there will
need to be more at stake than the fear of penalties or sanctions. Foreign litigators need to understand that U.S. discovery is, arguably,
the most significant phase in litigation, and failure to cooperate with
opposing counsel can result in an unfavorable outcome.
A workable solution for cross-border discovery is said to rest on
three prerequisites: (1) parties must be willing to disclose all information allowed by applicable law; (2) foreign entities must be prepared if there is any risk at all of being called upon to produce materials; and (3) parties must familiarize themselves with their opponent.197
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Two additional prerequisites can be added to this list. First, European and Latin American entities must have the ability to undertake a discovery request. E-discovery, being relatively new for
some, requires a special level of expertise in handling, sourcing, and
transferring data.198 U.S. courts have come to expect that parties are
capable of handling a request, especially if it is a larger entity.199 It
is possible that U.S. courts are willing to be more lenient with
smaller foreign entities, but that is no certainty. Courts are unlikely
to be lenient towards a smaller entity because it is too tedious to
determine who is worthy of leniency. Consequently, this ad-hoc approach is impractical: it is both time-consuming and costly. When
should a court decide to give leniency to a foreign entity? Should
the court review the entity’s financial statements in order to ascertain whether the entity is in a position to handle a cross-border discovery request? Thus, foreign entities should not expect to receive
any judicial leeway once a discovery request is made.
The second additional prerequisite can be labeled “civility.”200
In this context, being civil requires that one understands the opposing party.201 In the absence of civility, entities will either make ridiculous discovery demands or will refuse to cooperate at all. For
there to be a workable solution in conducting discovery with foreign
entities, both sides need to communicate regularly.202 Even if both
sides come to the realization that some data is not transferrable because it implicates a data protection law, a lack of civility will likely
enrage the party seeking the data, making them more likely to seek
a court-ordered discovery request. The violation of such a court order may result in sanctions or an adverse inference.
C. Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention
The next solution focuses entirely on the Hague Evidence Convention. Perhaps we need to see if the Convention is salvageable.
Modernizing the Convention would require that it be brought into
the reality of a world dominated by ESI-centered discovery. In order
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to modernize the Convention, there are at least four recommendations to put forward. The first is to create an amendment that will
establish a clear meaning of pre-trial discovery.203 The second is to
establish a minimum data protection standard, modeled after the
United Kingdom’s Model Letter of Request.204 The third and fourth
recommendations are to allow bilateral treaties among countries and
to place the burden of issuing Letters of Request on the Convention,
rather than the countries in which evidence is requested.205
It is argued that because so many countries were unfamiliar with
pre-trial discovery at the time the Convention was created, many of
them blindly signed Article 23 limiting reservations.206 It has been
discovered that some countries that signed an Article 23 limiting
reservation were under the impression that “pre-trial” discovery
meant that discovery would take place before a claim was filed.207
Perhaps those countries feared what they did not understand. It is
suggested that civil law countries now have a better understanding
of the scope of pre-trial discovery in the U.S.208 It is possible that
those countries that previously misunderstood pre-trial discovery
may now be willing to rescind their Article 23 limiting reservation.
If pre-trial discovery is as efficient and effective as it is claimed
to be, why would foreign countries not want to participate? One reason could be that even with foreign countries understanding what
pre-trial discovery is, allowing foreign entities to engage in it will
still result in the same potential data violations. Whether the data is
provided early or late in the litigation, it is still being provided; however, if foreign countries, like Argentina and EU members, were to
get a better understanding of pre-trial discovery, and if the U.S. established minimum data protection standards, then there may be a
different outcome. Modernizing the Convention may take as much
work as rewriting it.
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D. The Problem May Be Local Instead of Global.
Globalization can only work if there is give and take, and it requires active and well-guided government action.209 That is, to make
globalization work efficiently, countries must accept certain active
government involvement so that they can enjoy certain protectionist
benefits.210 Whether or not that is a perfect system is beyond the
scope of this paper. In order for countries and multinational corporations to continue conducting business on a global scale, there
needs to be a more unified system of cross-border discovery. Many
of the previously mentioned solutions placed the focus on foreign
countries. Is the U.S. to blame for these cross-border discovery dilemmas? It is possible that the problem does not lie within the EU
or Argentina, but rather the problem lies within the U.S. One solution is that the U.S. should heighten its level of data protection and
data privacy laws to that of the EU and Argentina.211 Another solution is that U.S. courts need to be more cognizant of discovery under
the PDPA and the EU Directive. Going one step further, courts may
need to assess the value of a case-by-case basis in determining the
merits of compelling discovery from a foreign entity. This last solution may assume that the judiciary must step in and reconcile the
issue because it is unlikely that the U.S. legislature will heighten its
data protection laws.
One could argue that U.S. pre-trial discovery requests are a cost
of conducting business in the U.S. Should a foreign party produce
documents and just pay fines if that means that they will not be subject to an adverse inference in a U.S. court? Essentially, the foreign
party is forced to make a cost-benefit analysis.212 Parties are forced
to determine whether the costs of violating Argentine data protection laws are outweighed by the benefit that following a discovery
request offers. Should it be in the policy of U.S. courts to incentivize
entities to break foreign laws if that means benefiting a U.S. litigant
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by allowing them to view the documents they requested? If the penalties for violating data protection laws in Argentina were nominal,
then the choice to produce materials does not require any more discussion; however, because the penalties can be severe, it is not an
easy choice. On the other hand, if the foreign party is availing itself
of the protections and benefits of U.S. laws while conducting business, should it be allowed to shield itself under data protection laws
of Argentina? U.S. courts have realized that some entities use the
laws of foreign countries to protect themselves.213 In Columbia Pictures, a California district court reiterated the position articulated in
Aerospatiale and held that foreign statutes do not prevent a court
from ordering a party to produce evidence.214
Quite possibly, the biggest impediment to the Hague Evidence
Convention is Aerospatiale.215 It has been suggested that perhaps in
order to make the give-and-take system of globalization work, the
U.S. should overturn Aerospatiale so that the Hague Evidence Convention is not wholly useless.216 Would a gesture, such as overturning Aerospatiale, convince civil law countries that we are willing to
compromise? Unlikely. If data privacy is as fundamental a right as
it is claimed to be, then overturning Aerospatiale is enough to bring
about change.
Conceptually, international treaties tend to take a one-size-fitsall approach to solving issues that affect scores of countries. This is
problematic for obvious reasons. Every country—and every culture
for that matter—has a unique view. Data privacy and cross-border
discovery are no exception to this phenomenon. The fact that many
countries have not signed limiting reservations to the Hague Evidence Convention shows that not all countries are opposed to the
use of pre-trial discovery Letters of Request. Even if countries were
unfamiliar with pre-trial discovery upon becoming a party to the
Convention, they still may be disinclined to allow discovery requests. Again, to distinguish, common law countries and civil law
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countries have different procedures for conducting discovery. In
civil law countries, judges often conduct discovery.217
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite guidelines and protocols to cross-border discovery, any
solution to the problem between the U.S. and Argentina will require
some compromise between the two countries. After looking at the
European model and the issues that are created by the EU directive,
it seems clear that the U.S. and Argentina need to work together in
finding a solution that is unique to each countries’ needs. A onesize-fits-all approach is not likely to be helpful because each country’s views on data privacy are as unique as an individual’s fingerprint.
What makes cross-border discovery in Argentina especially difficult is that its data protection laws are almost unpredictable. In order to solve the discovery disputes between the U.S. and Argentina,
at least three conditions must be met: (1) Argentine law makers must
make violations of data protection law clearer; (2) U.S. courts needs
to recognize that data privacy needs to be respected; and (3) U.S.
courts should only apply sanctions and penalties in egregious situations. Argentine authorities need to clarify their willingness to comply with their own laws. If Argentine litigators are not fearful of being reprimanded for violating Argentine data protection laws, then
the discussion does not need to go any further.
As the NSA’s vast surveillance program has come to light recently, the EU has been increasingly reluctant to negotiate with the
U.S. regarding trade.218 U.S. courts need to be more accepting of the
fact that data privacy is a fundamental right in Argentina, and that it
is not a malleable concept that can be used for the benefit of U.S.
litigants.
Lastly, U.S. courts should avoid using adverse inferences when
foreign litigants are complying with foreign data privacy laws. Such
sanctions should be reserved for egregious violations; for example,
217
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when parties intentionally retain discoverable materials because of
its damaging nature.

